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I.  Introduction.  In this paper we intend to criticize three models of reduction that have been offered in the philosophical literature and elaborate some features of an alternative model recently proposed, that understands the goals of scientific research and the end results of the sciences, particularly biology and neuroscience, as being the discovery and elucidation of mechanisms.  This work was started in Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000), and has been carried on elsewhere, (Cf. Craver and Darden 2001, Sullivan 2000, and Bogen's paper in this workshop).  Along the way we hope to elaborate at greater length some aspects of mechanisms, in particular activities, which have not been sufficiently dealt with in previous work.
Reductionism gained significant attention in the philosophy of science during the mid to late 20th century. Ernest Nagel  (1961 and other works) outlined what is known as the classical model of intertheoretic reduction, which specifies a set of conditions for the reduction of one theory to another.  Basically, the model requires connectivity and derivability among the sentences that comprise the reducing and reduced theories. We shall not be much concerned with derivability in this paper. 
The introduction of Nagel’s model set the stage for more general and case-specific discussions of reductionism in both philosophy of science and philosophy of mind.  Some philosophers (Fodor (1974, 1997); Davidson (1980 [1963], 1980 [1970]); Kim (1996, 1997, 1998); Beatty (  ); Kitcher (1984); Rosenberg (1994)) took seriously the Nagelian framework and argued against the feasibility of intertheoretic reduction in the ‘special’ and biological sciences. Other philosophers (notably, Schaffner (1967, 1993a, 1993); Hooker (1981a, 1981b); Churchland (1998, 1991); Bickle (1992, 1998)), dissatisfied with the limitations of the Nagelian model yet explicitly committed to the importance of reductionism in the ‘special’ and biological sciences, introduced alternative models of reductionism.  
Both classical and modern philosophical models of reduction either contain the following claims or have them as explicit or implicit presuppositions (or assumptions). All of these assumptions are required by the way in which the connectability constraint is supposed to work: 
(1) Phenomena and the study of phenomena may be subdivided into levels (i.e., either ontic or epistemic), with one scientific domain (scientific discipline or theory) taking one specific level as the focus of its analyses and explanations. 
(2) These levels are organized hierarchically, and each level may be treated as discrete and (theoretically or explanatorily) independent from another. 
(3) The hierarchical ordering relation among levels is from complex to simple, from large to small, from less to more fundamental, or from whole to part.  Often these distinctions are treated as synonymous. 
(4) Levels are specified by particular terms that describe specific kinds of entities and properties that are those studied by, or are "fundamental" to, a given science or theory.  This means the entities studied by a science are presumed (in the ideal case) to be all at the same level.  In other words, ideally, theories or explanations (or sciences) are uni-level. 
(5) The relations between terms (or the entities and properties they describe) necessary for reduction are specified by (synthetic) identity statements (bridge statements).  Often the identity statements are given in terms of part-whole relations that apply to the entities and their composition, but sometimes merely bi-conditional equivalence between terms is thought to be sufficient. Some philosophers hold that such relation statements must be law-like.
(6) The identity statements must allow for substitutivity of the terms flanking the identity sign, i.e., between levels.  This, they take, to presuppose the extensional equivalence among the referents of terms flanking the identity sign.  In some models, this extensional equivalence is guaranteed by the derivability constraint. 
(7) Most philosophers seem to assume the possibility of complete reduction, though we shall have something to say about what Schaffner (1993) calls partial reductions below.
	Each of these seven assumptions contradict or neglect several important features of scientific explanations. First, explanations in science, most notably in the biological sciences, are not uni-level; they are what Schaffner (1993) has characterized as multi-level.  Yet this characterization falls short too, because it is based upon the assumption that we can separate out ontic levels in scientific explanations, and assign the entities to which such explanations make reference to discrete levels. ​[1]​  As we hope to demonstrate below, this is often not the case.  
A second feature of scientific explanations not captured in the above assumptions is that they contain references to activities as well as entities, a point made recently by Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000).  Concomitantly, there is an assumption that reduction deals only with entities and their properties and not at all with activities, i.e., what these entities do.  This presupposition is clear in many of the above assumptions, but most notably in (5) where part-whole relations are taken to hold among entities that figure in a reduction.  This exclusive focus, ontically or epistemically, on entities neglects the important role of activities as productive of phenomena under empirical investigation.  Activities are essential components of any scientific explanation and in so far as they differ from entities, it is, at least, not clear they are reducible in any way that entities are regarded as being reducible.  (Cf. MDC 2000)  The basic reason activities are necessary is that they describe how one ‘state’ is productive of ano0ther; or how one entity acting brings about a change in some other part of the mechanism.  Activities, thus, are what show how the changes come about; ultimately, they are the reasons why one thing (e.g. the next state) comes about rather than another.
	We aim to clarify the nature of scientific explanations, to specify problems for the view that explanations fit neatly into a levels framework, and to demonstrate the important role of activities in explanations by means of a general argument and an analysis of a representative case study—that of LTP and memory in neuroscience, which has recently been the focus of at least one reductionist model (see Bickle (1998) and Schouten & Loreen-de-Jong (1999)). In so doing, we hope to show that the three models of reduction we shall consider are not only descriptively inaccurate in so far as they fail to adequately capture what neuroscientists themselves take to be at stake in scientific explanation or reduction, but also, normatively problematic, in so far as they specify, minimally incomplete and maximally incoherent goals for scientific research and explanation.  
Two interesting conclusions are borne out from this analysis.  First, what scientists mean by the term “level” is a harmless, adequately clear notion when used for the practical purpose of specifying domains of interest in specific research projects; this is not true when philosophers employ the term “level”.  Secondly, what scientists seem to mean when they talk about “reduction” is finding the mechanisms by which things work.  In turn, it seems only reasonable that models of scientific explanation should ideally capture the mechanistic bent of modern day scientists; for the sakes of descriptive accuracy and normative rigor, this is what philosophers ought to mean by reductionism as well.  On a mechanistic interpretation, “reduction” becomes a harmless, mostly clear goal for doing science.  It most often means the filling in of ‘mechanism schemata’.	

II. Reductionism:  The Classical Model.  According to a classical model of intertheoretic reduction (Nagel 1961), reduction is thought to be a special relation that can obtain exclusively between distinct scientific theories.   On this model, to reduce a theory T2 to a theory T1 requires (1) that the statements of T2 be deducible from the statements of T1 (derivability) and (2) that a set of laws can be articulated, bridging or connecting the terms of the reduced theory T2 to the terms of the reducing theory T1 (connectability/bridge laws).  While derivability is a sufficient condition for reduction, connectability is a necessary condition for reduction.  It is specifically the articulation of the connections between terms in the reduced and reducing theory that enables the successful derivation of one theory from the other.  The paradigm case of this type of reduction often was held to be the reduction of the ideal gas laws to kinetic theory; or thermodynamics to statistical mechanics.  (but cf. Sklar 1999)
According to Nagel, several conditions must be satisfied before a given case of theory reduction can occur. The first condition amounts to a claim that the reducing theory must be more “inclusive” than the reducing theory in so far as it must explain (Nagel 1961, 337) the entire set of phenomena that the theory to be reduced previously has been used to explain.  This, in effect, guarantees the extensional co-equivalence of whatever entities are included in the one domain with those included by the other.  Secondly, Nagel claims that the two theories that are candidates for a reduction relation must be sufficiently developed, where “sufficient” is determined by the formal requirements of connectability and derivability.  As Nagel states, “the axioms, special hypotheses, and experimental laws of the sciences involved in a reduction must be available as explicitly formulated statements, whose various constituent terms have meanings unambiguously fixed by codified rules” (Nagel 1961, 345). Such fixity must precede attempts to connect the meanings of the terms of the two theories in some identity relation.  
To take an example, philosophers who are concerned about the possibility of the future reduction of folk psychological theory to neuroscientific theory recognize that a necessary precondition for such intertheoretic reduction is a well-developed or “mature” neuroscientific theory capable of explaining behavior solely by appeal to brain states (Fodor [1974 & 1978] 1983; Churchland 1986; Kim 1999; Putnam [1973] 1983; Sklar 1999).  For example, the argument goes, a mental state term, such as “pain”, could be reduced if one could find a suitable a brain state term, which referred to the neurological state that underlies the mental state. 
What is interesting about this claim is that in order to achieve the requisite mappings between mental state terms and brain state terms, one must construe brain states as fixed entities that have decomposable parts (i.e., neurons).   However, most likely, the neurological referent for our folk psychological term “pain” will be an explanation that utilizes entities of varying sizes (ions, cells, transmitters, proteins) engaging in numerous complex activities (flowing, releasing, binding). For example, when neurons fire, they send electrical-biochemical signals to other neurons; they undergo depolarization, which is accompanied by the flow of ions into (Na+, Ca++) and out of (K+) the intracellular space and the release of neurotransmitters which bind to receptors on post-synaptic cells and result in intracellular events such as depolarization and the activation of biochemical cascades.  This is not a purely neuron-level phenomenon, nor a purely molecular-level phenomenon.  In fact, it is not straightforward how this explanation can be parsed into discrete levels. First, while we can identify the terms that pick out the entities and activities that factor into this explanation, it is not clear what part-whole relationships the entities bear to one another, which makes it difficult to assign them to discrete levels.  Secondly, the explanation makes reference to activities, which are traditionally treated by reductionists as entities (e.g, “neural firing”, “transmitter release”) or as properties of entities (e.g., “depolarization” might be construed as a property of a cell, when a cell is in a depolarized state), rather than as independent kinds.  In this way, activities are also often thought to fit neatly into the levels framework.  However, if entities fail to fit, then activities understood as entities or properties of entities will also fail to fit.  
It is worthwhile to point out here, that the descriptions of activities in this explanation are treated separately—not as properties of entities, but as things that entities do—and they play just as critical a role in the explanation as do entity descriptions.  In this explanation, they connect together entities of varying types and sizes.  For example, “binding” connects together neurotransmitters and receptors.  
If entities and activities, two essential aspects of scientific explanations, do not fit neatly into the levels framework, which is the basis for reductionist arguments, then we ought to question the descriptive accuracy of such models, and look towards alternative models. We will better elaborate these points in the sections to follow, and offer our arguments with reference to more specific examples.  

III.  Alternative Models of Reductionism:  The General Reduction Replacement Model. Schaffner (1993) agrees, as do Wimsatt (1994) and others (Bechtel & Richardson 1993), that the ontological levels hierarchy as it has been more recently conceived by biologists and philosophers of science, is arranged in terms of part-wholes, proceeding from the molecular to the cellular to more complex levels (e.g., behavioral).  Yet, Schaffner rejects the view that scientific theories contain terms that make reference to entities situated at only one level in the hierarchy.  Rather, he recognizes that, in contrast to theories in physics and chemistry, theories in neurobiology employ “both broad and narrow (possibly probabilistic) causal generalizations which are typically not framed in purely biochemical terminology, but which are characteristically [interfield] or interlevel” (Schaffner, 1993, 263, 285).  He calls such theories, “middle-range theories” and states that “the components of middle-range theories are usually presented as temporal models, namely as collections of entities that undergo a process” (Schaffner 1993, 98).   Further, he claims that these theories can be understood as generally structured along the lines of the D-N model of explanation in so far as they contain an explanans, comprised of a set of causal generalizations statements (including background assumptions that consist of widely accepted concepts or principles that do not approximate “laws”) and a set of antecedent conditions, and a general statement constituting the explanandum, or event to be explained.   
		Schaffner claims that interlevel theories can engage in specific kinds of reduction relations.  To this end he offers an alternative to Nagelian intertheoretic reduction, which he labels the General Reduction Replacement (GRR) Model.  This model differs in a number of ways from Nagel’s model, but we wish to look at how it allows for partial reductions of theories.  To this end, we will be concerned primarily with Schaffner’s use of Eric Kandel’s explanation of  “why the “sea hare” Aplysia californicum, develop[s] a heightened response to touch stimulation when subjected to a simultaneous noxious stimulus” (Schaffner 1993, 276).  The explanation of this phenomenon of learning, which is referred to generally as “sensitization”, is a form of cellular plasticity similar to LTP (in the mammalian brain), the case study we will consider in Section VII.
		In order to study sensitization in Aplysia, Kandel and colleagues focused on a simple innate defensive reflex called the gill-siphon withdrawal reflex.  Aplysia has a gill, located in a mantle cavity on its dorsal side that is covered by a mantle shelf, which forms a fleshy protrusion at the posterior end called the siphon.  When a tactile stimulus (e.g., a paintbrush) is applied to the siphon or mantle shelf, it results in a dual reflex:  (1) the siphon contracts and withdraws behind the parapodia (winglike extensions on the wall of the body) and (2) the gill withdraws into the mantle cavity.  When a noxious stimulus, such as a shock, is applied to the head or tail, the subsequent gill-siphon withdrawal reflex, when a tactile stimulus is applied to the gill or siphon, is significantly enhanced.​[2]​​[3]​ The duration of the enhancement depends upon the duration of application of the noxious stimulus.  While a shorter duration results in what Kandel and colleagues have termed “short term sensitization’, which lasts for several hours, a longer duration results in “long-term sensitization”, an enhancement in the response lasting several weeks.  These two forms of learning are widely thought to be correlates of short-term and long-term memory, and since the gill-siphon withdrawal reflex involves a simple circuitry of abdominal ganglia, Kandel and colleagues readily used Aplysia to locate the cellular and molecular mechanisms responsible for the two kinds of sensitization.  
		This explanation of sensitization involved what may be considered “reductive steps” (Dudai), which amounted to explaining the reflex first, behaviorally; secondly, isolating the circuitry involved in elicitation of the response; thirdly, considering the contributions of individual neurons to the response, and lastly, considering the contribution of extracellular and intracellular mechanisms to the response.  Schaffner implicitly claims these reductive steps can be viewed as accompanied by partial theory reductions, in so far as when an analysis of a phenomenon moves down a level in the ontological framework, the explanation moves down a level as well.  Further, Schaffner also suggests that Kandel and colleagues goal in taking such reductive steps was to arrive at a uni-level explanation of the phenomenon.  In fact, he refers to the explanation of the gill-siphon withdrawal reflex as a “molecular” explanation.  In order to specify what is problematic about Schaffner’s use of this case as an example of theory reduction it is necessary to provide a brief account of his position on “reduction replacements”, as well as how he understands “partial” and “uni-level” reductions.
		Schaffner’s formal account of reduction-replacement is essentially syntactic in so far as he is interested in reduction relationships or mappings between the terms in the causal generalization statements of a theory to be reduced and a reducing theory.  According to this model, TR is an original theory to be reduced and TB is a reducing theory. TR contains both statements about antecedent conditions and causal generalization statements and might make reference to causes situated at different “levels of aggregation”. For example, a theory about a behavior such as “long-term sensitization” might contain causal generalization statements that make reference to neurons, proteins (e.g., receptors or ion channels) and genes not thought to be situated at identical levels.  According to Schaffner, in a case of partial reduction, a component of TR, namely a causal generalization statement pertaining to one level of aggregation (e.g., neuron), could be reduced to a causal generalization statement contained in TB, that makes reference to causes at a lower level of aggregation (e.g., “protein molecules”).  This reduction could occur while the other components of TR remain intact or unreduced.  Such partial reduction occurs: 

as scientists further develop reducing theories in a domain; and [. . .] elaborate various parts of the theories, both by (a) modifying a -level assumption or proposing a -level assumption that accounts for (part of) a -level process and by (b) describing these new assumptions in causal terms (Schaffner 1993, 495).

		Schaffner holds that partial reduction results from “ongoing advances that occur in piecemeal ways, for instance, as some features of a model are further elaborated at the molecular level or perhaps a new “mechanism” is added to the model” (Schaffner 1993, 495).  However, he maintains that “mechanism” is an  “unanalyzed term”, that some account of “laws of working” would need to precede an account of mechanisms, and that it is precisely such an account of “laws of working” that we lack in the biological sciences.  What we have instead of laws are widely accepted background assumptions about such things as, structural features of different types of neurons, how transmitter is released from neurons, biochemical properties of cells, to name but a few.  In turn, he leaves the term “mechanism” unanalyzed and maintains that “partial reductions” merely amount to further sets of more developed causal generalizations at lower levels of aggregation. 
		Schaffner claims to be able to accommodate both informal and formal partial reductions on his model.   By an informal partial reduction, he means the kind of reduction that involves the elaboration of a given theory by means of the articulation of specific causes that make reference to a level of aggregation not contained in the theory to be reduced (TR).  In this case no formal reduction relations hold between two distinct theories, TR and TB, rather a component of TR is merely elaborated in so far as it refers to entities situated at a lower level of aggregation.  By a formal partial reduction, he means the replacement of a component of a causal generalization statement contained in a theory TR by a component in a causal generalization statement contained in a reducing theory TB, that makes reference only to entities situated at a lower level of aggregation. Whereas, an informal partial reduction might be characteristic of a theory in the process of development and elaboration, which is instantiated by the Aplysia case, a formal partial reduction is a relation in which a more mature scientific theory could participate.   
		Schaffner takes either form of partial reduction to be a stage in theory development and elaboration that, unlike Nagel’s model of reduction, allows for the piecemeal reduction of theories.  However, he insists that partial reductions are not an endpoint for theory articulation and development; rather, they are “surrogates” for a “uni-level” reduction (Schaffner 1993, 319).  He argues that while neurobiology and the biomedical sciences “must [currently] appeal to [the] interlevel features” of the phenomena they study, once causal generalizations about higher-level entities [e.g., neurons] are understood in terms of causal generalizations about lower-level entities [e.g., molecules], uni-level theories will replace interlevel theories.   In fact, Schaffner goes so far as to argue that uni-level reduction is the hallmark of a fully “clarified science”, and that its realization requires the satisfaction of two specific conditions.  First, causal generalizations contained in the explanans of a given theory must be completely reduced to terminology referring to processes occurring at one specific level of aggregation.  Secondly, the explanandum must be uni-level in so far as it contains a generalization statement situated at the same or different level of aggregation as the explanans.  		
		In light of this account of Schaffner’s model, consider the explanation of sensitization in Aplysia that he offers as an example of a uni-level, namely molecular, explanation.  A simplified version of the hypothesis at which Kandel and colleagues arrived is sufficient to consider for our purposes here:  (1) The facilitory neuron, upon prolonged activation, releases transmitter into the synaptic cleft, which, when it binds to specific receptors on the post-synaptic sensory neuron (2) activates G-proteins associated with these receptors, which activate the adenosine 3',5'-cyclic monophosphate (cAMP) cascade that results in phosphorylation and closure of an S-potassium channel via cAMP-dependent protein kinase (PKA) and (3) causes a sufficient amount of calcium (Ca++) influx to activate other biochemical cascades in the sensory neuron. (4) The initial hypothesis was that the activated second messenger systems were responsible for the phenomenon of sensitization.  (5) It was later determined, through manipulation and blocking of these cascades, that while second messenger cascades alone are sufficient to produce short-term sensitization, in long-term sensitization, these second-messenger systems, as a result of prolonged activation by prolonged exposure to the noxious stimulus, result in changes in gene expression.   
		As we mentioned above, we take Schaffner to be using the sensitization hypothesis as an instance of an informal reduction, which he believes can ultimately be reduced to a uni-level, specifically molecular, hypothesis.  The hypothesis implicitly contains a set of antecedent conditions (e.g., prolonged stimulation of the tail and facilitory neuron), and a set of causal generalization statements that taken together explain the phenomenon.  What an informal reduction (which may proceed by a series of partial reductions) on Schaffner’s model requires, is that each of these statements make reference to entities situated at the molecular level (or similarly, biochemical/molecular level).  This requires the satisfaction of three preliminary conditions, namely that (1) the descriptions of entities in the current hypothesis can be assigned to levels (2) the descriptions of entities to which these descriptions are to be reduced can be identified and (3) some reduction relation between the two descriptions can be specified, resulting in an hypothesis that is ideally as explanatory as the original.  
		Clearly these three conditions are not satisfied in the Aplysia case.  In this explanation we have a facilitory neuron which is stimulated when the tail is stimulated.  So this means we have a tail-level and a neuron-level, and stimulation is of both simultaneously, by virtue of the neurons connected to the tail by the appropriate "wiring" mechanism.  The neuron releases transmitter some of which goes into the synaptic cleft--now it's hard to say whether we have one or two levels here.  Are the cleft and the neuron on the same level?  And does the release of neuro-transmitter by the neuron, count as part of the neuron and so is an activity that happens at the same level?  Release of neurotransmitter involves the emission of a fluid which flows throughout the synaptic cleft, and from there part of the fluid binds to receptors on the post synaptic sensory neuron, and some is recycled or taken back up into the axon terminal.  Now binding is an activity and it involves part of the neuro-transmitter forming a mechanico-chemical relation with the receptors that are part of another neuron.  But are the neuro-transmitter, the neurons, the parts of neurons, the intervening space between neurons, at the same level?
		It hardly makes sense to ask such questions.  Yet, we may use quite aptly part-whole talk, but the neurotransmitter was part of the facilitory neuron, for that is from whence it came; but it was not a part like the receptor is part of the post synaptic neuron.  The production of neurotransmitter for release within the facilitory neuron is not a spatial part of the neuron. It is more like saliva to be spit in a human body, than like an arm. But the main point here is that once we talk about activities and how they connect things in mechanisms, we ought not to be forced into talking about levels, or even part-whole relations.  Many times such locutions are not even possible, and most of the time, as in this case, requiring their use obfuscates the point of providing the description of the mechanisms.  More generally, the assumptions and related language required by the reductionist (traditional or new wave) are not satisfied.  The language does not fit.  We cannot in many cases even specify levels, or have clear criteria to determine which entities should be regarded as on the same level.  
		We may see the same point by looking at the last part of sentence (5) " these second-messenger systems, as a result of prolonged activation by prolonged exposure to the noxious stimulus, result in changes in gene expression." Here we have activation of a second messenger system connected to prolonged exposure to a noxious stimulus (applied to the tail).  Now it seems the tail and the noxious stimulus might be on the same level, but certainly a second messenger system is not on that level, nor is it at the level of an expressed gene.  
		Schaffner insists that a unilevel reduction of the causal hypothesis can be achieved if “stimuli can be interpreted as propagating action potentials, neurotransmitters can be construed as chemical messengers” and “biochemical cascades can be examined as fine-structure connecting networks ultimately leading to the event to be explained” (Schaffner 1993, 291).  However, in order to achieve the kind of uni-level reduction he wants, he does not demonstrate how the original hypothesis fits into the levels framework and how its components may be reduced, instead, he proposes a modification of the current hypotheses to make it fit on one level.  Yet again, it is not clear how “chemical messengers” and “fine-structure connecting networks” might be understood as being on the same level, and he does not provide an argument to this effect.  Further, his modifications leave out features of the hypothesis that are essential to explaining the phenomenon.  Lastly and most importantly, Kandel and colleagues goal in attempting to find the cellular and molecular bases of sensitization in Aplysia was not to provide a uni-level explanation of the phenomenon, rather, they sought to discover and describe the mechanisms that produce sensitization.   The hypothesis, or what we want to call “mechanism schemata” (Machamer, Darden Craver 2000) at which they arrived does just this, and as we have demonstrated, it is not subject to reduction relations in the way Schaffner conceives them.  
IV.  Alternative Models of Reductionism:  Bickle and New Wave Reductionism (Bickle). Bickle (1998) has recently proposed a model of reductionism that he calls “new-wave reductionism”, which differs from classical reductionism in so far as it is based on a semantic rather than sentential account of theories—a distinction that he borrows from the structuralists (e.g., Suppes 1956).  Like Schaffner, Bickle assumes that the candidates for reduction relations are models rather than theories, as “scientific theories are properly conceived in terms of their models” (Bickle 1998, 59).   However, he takes a set-theoretical approach to the “explication of scientific theories” by depicting theories as models that contain sets of elements, rather than terms, that represent those entities or properties that are the focus of a given model.
Despite this distinction, Bickle’s model is similar to traditional models of reductionism in several ways.  First, Bickle assumes that the entities and properties to which scientific theories/models refer are hierarchically organized and that scientific theories or models are unilevel; that the elements that they contain pertain to entities situated on one distinct level in the ontological hierarchy (e.g., he places “cognitive entities” on one level; “neurophysiological entities” on another “lower” level).  He maintains this hierarchy is constitutive in so far as higher-level entities (e.g., “associative learning”) are comprised of lower level entities (e.g., “molecules”). He also takes reduction relations to involve both an epistemic aspect and an “ontological aspect” (Bickle 1998, 76)—when one theoretical model is reduced to another, there is an accompanying ontological reduction link (ORL) in so far as models containing elements that represent entities comprising higher level “empirical base sets” are related to models containing elements that represent entities that comprise lower level “empirical base sets”.  
According to Bickle, all scientific theories are characterized in terms of a specific subset of potential models Mp(Tx); these models are “depicted by the theory” (Bickle 1998, 62). A reduction relation is one that obtains between the elements  x',x  of a model of the theory to be reduced (TB) and a model of the reducing theory (TR).   One pragmatic requirement of the two models is that they must have what Bickle terms “confirmed intended empirical or real-world applications”.   In other words, the two models that are candidates for a given reduction relation must be accepted by a group of scientists as explanatory of a given phenomenon or set of phenomena.
On the new-wave reductionism model, in order for a reduction relation to obtain between two models, an analog relation, TR*, must be specified between the model of the theory to be reduced, M(TB), which is a member of a set of potential models of the theory to be reduced (Mp(TB)),  and a model of the reducing theory, (M(TR)), which is a member of a set of potential models of (TR), or Mp(TR).  Bickle maintains that for any reduction relation a certain set of constraints including counterfactual assumptions, which he denotes as “C​R” are specified for the analog relation.  He states “these additional assumptions are additional clauses (“axioms”) conjoined to the definition of the set-theoretic predicate “is a (potential model of the) [. . .] theory (Bickle 67).”  Bickle stresses that if these additional assumptions contain corrections to TB​[4]​, then the analog relation TR* will necessarily contain additional elements that are not a part of M(TB). 
Bickle calls this relationship between the analog relation and the reduced theory “” and he specifies a set of conditions for .  It is sufficient, for our purposes here, to mention the connectability requirement that Bickle articulates for the relationship , while setting aside several other additional conditions and subconditions he proposes. Bickle states: “for all elements x of the confirmed intended empirical applications of the reduced theory, there is some element x' belonging to the intersection of the analog structure with the confirmed intended empirical applications of the reducing theory such that x' and x stand in the reduction relation” (Bickle 1998, 69-70).  This condition basically amounts to a claim that the elements contained in the theory to be reduced must be contained in the reducing theory and result in a direct mapping between the elements of the two theories.  
Bickle allows for various kinds of reduction relations between the elements contained in the potential models of the reduced and reducing theories, but we are primarily concerned with one type of reduction relation that he specifies, namely “combinatorial reduction”.  He indirectly defines this type of reduction by pointing out what he takes to be an instance of it, namely, the reduction of associative learning theories to neurophysiological theories of LTP.  For example, say we have two potential models, one situated at a higher-level and one situated at a lower-level, that each contain elements that can be used to explain the same phenomenon, namely, associative learning.  A combinatorial reduction between the two models can be achieved if the set of elements that directly pertain to real entities that comprise the empirical base set of reducing model can be combined and directly mapped onto the set of elements of the model to be reduced.   After considering the LTP case study in detail below, we will articulate what is problematic about Bickle’s use of this case as an example of reduction. 
V.  LTP as a Case Study
Contemporary philosophers of science concerned with issues of explanation, reduction, and integration in science have turned their attention to modern research in the neurobiology of learning and memory and utilized specific case studies from this context to either argue for (Bickle 1998) or (Schouten and Loreen-de-Jong 1999) against the reduction of psychological to neuroscientific theories. Of particular interest has been the phenomenon of activity dependent long-term potentiation (LTP), one form of synaptic modification or plasticity thought to underlie learning and memory.  
LTP is induced in a variety of structures in the mammalian brain (e.g., hippocampus and amygdala) using high frequency tetanic stimulation, which, when applied to the axons of presynaptic neurons has been demonstrated to result in a semi-permanent change in the way in which these cells excite the postsynaptic neurons to which they project.  This change in excitation is thought to be a result of specific biochemical cascades that become activated in the post-synaptic neuron following LTP inducing stimuli, which are thought to trigger transcription factors that result in structural changes, namely, the growth of new dendritic spines, on the post-synaptic cell.  While much is still unknown about the mechanisms that produce LTP, a widespread assumption of LTP researchers is that the cellular changes that result from high frequency tetanic stimulation either comprise an engram or memory trace or are involved in some stage in the production of the engram (see  ).  Taking this assumption seriously, Bickle argues that a reduction of theories of associative learning (sp., Rescorla & Wagner’s model) might be reduced to LTP hypotheses currently available.  In this section we will first consider the LTP case, and then demonstrate what is problematic about Bickle’s use of it as an instance of a “combinatorial reduction”.  
The best-understood and historically most studied form of LTP in the mammalian brain is hippocampal N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor dependent LTP.  In what follows, we will restrict our discussion to a simplified version of the hypothesis that has been proposed to explain this form of LTP.  For the sake of brevity, we will restrict our attention to hypotheses arising from one representative area of LTP research, namely, in vivo electrophysiological experiments. In these experiments LTP is induced in anesthetized animals (e.g., rats or rabbits) in one of two pathways projecting to pyramidal cell populations.  While the following account shall be somewhat simplified, it will be sufficient for the argument we wish to make (For a more detailed account see Roberson, English & Sweatt 1996; Martin, Grimwood and Morris 2000; and Schors and Matzel 1997).
  Hippocampal NMDA-receptor dependent LTP can be induced by a brief period of high frequency tetanic stimulation (HFS) (e.g., 15Hz for 10 sec or 100Hz for 3-4 seconds)), typically comprised of multiple trains, applied to the axons of presynaptic neurons in one of two discrete pathways in the hippocampus:  Either the perforant pathway dentate gyrus granule cell synapses which project to Schaffer collateral-CA1 pyramidal cell synapses or the perforant pathway CA3 axons which project onto CA1 pyramidal cell synapses via the longitudinal-commissural pathway.  This type of stimulation has been demonstrated to result in a persistent increase in synaptic efficacy in these pathways as is evidenced by a persistent increase in the excitatory post-synaptic potentials (EPSP’s) of CA1 pyramidal cells.  
This persistent increase in EPSP’s in these cells is explained in the following way:  (1) Upon HFS applied to the axons of the pre-synaptic neurons, these cells fire an action potential.  During the action potential there is an influx of Na+ ions through voltage gated sodium channels and an efflux of K+ ions through potassium channels, during which time the cells become depolarized.  (2) Depolarization opens voltage gated calcium channels, which allow an influx of calcium ions into the axon.  (3) This influx triggers release of vesicles containing the neurotransmitter glutamate from the pre-synaptic axon into the synaptic cleft.  (4) Glutamate first binds to the AMPA receptors on the post-synaptic neuron, which changes the conformation of these receptors, activating them, allowing sodium ion influx into the cells and potassium ion efflux into the extracellular space.  (5) The cells become sufficiently depolarized to trigger the release of the intracellular magnesium block from the NMDA receptors.  (6) Glutamate binds to the NMDA receptors, causing a change in the conformation of these receptors, which permits calcium ion influx into the cells.  (7) Calcium ions activate protein kinases, (e.g., calmodulin, protein kinase A (PKA)), which phosphorylate ion channels and receptors, and activate transcription factors (i.e. protein synthesis), whose activation results in cellular changes, namely, the formation of dendritic spines on post-synaptic cells, which is a form of plasticity.  It is these cellular changes that are thought to result in an increase in synaptic efficacy between the pre- and post-synaptic cells.   The increase in the number of dendrites receiving the output of the presynaptic neuron results in a larger EPSP.
Each model of reductionism that we have analyzed above either explicitly or implicitly assumes that ontic levels can be identified and that they are separated into wholes and their constituent parts, and arranged from more to less complex and that theory reduction involves reducing a theory that employs terms pertaining to higher-level entities (wholes), to terms pertaining to lower-level entities (i.e., parts of those wholes).  Yet, if we take even a simplified version of the LTP hypothesis, which is structurally similar to explanations that have been offered to explain similar kinds of phenomena in the biological and neurosciences, can we successfully separate out parts and wholes? Could we in a principled way assign these parts and wholes to discrete ontic levels? May we, in any scientifically illuminating way, say what level the hypothesis is on and to what level it ought to be reduced?  In other words, does an argument for reduction make sense with respect to this case?
    (1) The hypothesis begins, see sentence (1) above, when stimulation is applied to axons of pre-synaptic neurons, [and more specifically, Schaffer collateral neurons in area CA3 of the hippocampus, as LTP is induced via this pathway] this results in an influx of ions into these neurons through both voltage-gated (Na+ and Ca++) and non-voltage-gated (K+) ion channels.  Schaffer collateral neurons project from area CA3 of the hippocampus, but are they part of the hippocampus in the same way that area CA3 is part of the hippocampus? Schaffer collaterals connect together area CA3 of the hippocampus to area CA1.  Are both the collaterals and area CA3 on the same level?  Well, they are not the same diameter in terms of microns, but both are parts of the hippocampus. So we might be tempted to say they are on the same level, but is being a part, in some sense, of the same whole sufficient to determine that two entities are at the same level, even if they are not the same size?  What about axons? Axons might be considered parts of neurons, in the way that cell bodies and basal and apical dendrites are parts of neurons. However, voltage and non-voltage gated channels are also parts of neurons. Are they parts of neurons in the same way that axons are parts of neurons? Again, they are clearly not the same size in terms of diameter in microns, so can we say in any interesting way that they are on the same level?  What about ions?  Are they parts of the intracellular or extracellular space, or are they parts of both some of the time?  Ions flow back and forth from the extracellular space to the intracellular space via channels.  Gating is an activity of ion channels, which regulates the flow of ions.  But, are neurons, the parts of neurons, and the extracellular space between neurons all at the same level?  
Similarly, we might ask, are vesicles containing glutamate parts of the presynaptic axon?  Of which entity are vesicles a part after they have been released into the synaptic cleft, the axon or the synaptic cleft?  During transmitter release, the vesicular membrane sometimes becomes a part of the lipid membrane, but the glutamate that these vesicles contained is released or pushed out.  In this form glutamate is no longer a part of the axon, but would we say it is a part of the synaptic cleft?  Similarly, when glutamate binds to the AMPA and NMDA receptors on the post-synaptic cell, does it become a part of these receptors?  Is the intracellular magnesium block part of the NMDA receptor?  What is it a part of after it is released?
Again, we ask, are the protein kinases, which are situated in the post-synaptic cell, a part of that cell?   Are they a part of that cell in the same way as the ion channels and receptors that they phosphorylate?  Phosphorylation is an activity that connects together kinases with entities such as (1) AMPA receptors; (2) a subunit on the NMDAR receptor; and (3) ion channels.  All of these entities are parts of the post-synaptic cell, but are they on the same level?  
A proponent of reductionism is required to answer such questions before providing an account of how a reduction of current LTP hypotheses might be realized. Yet, no clear-cut answers can be offered for such questions.  This is primarily because the entities to which LTP hypotheses make reference engage in activities that connect together entities of varying types, shapes and sizes that oftentimes cannot be conceived as bearing part-whole relations to one other, or as situated on distinct levels.  However, even in making reference to entities of differing sizes, these hypotheses are explanatory.  Furthermore, it is not clear how they would be explanatory if the entities to which they make reference were broken down into smaller and smaller parts.  For example, if we talked about an entity such as the NMDA receptor, merely in terms of the subunits or the proteins that comprise it, how would we talk about the structural features of that receptor that are relevant to ion gating, such as the internal magnesium block, or how would we explain the activity of the receptor in terms of the depolarization requisite to relieve the magnesium block, and the binding of glutamate to it, and ion gating, which are all "part" of the structural features of the receptor as a whole?  While descriptions of the receptor may make reference to parts of the receptor and what these parts do, there is not a reduction in these descriptions of the receptor to its parts, nor could there be such a reduction that would result in an intelligible explanation. It is the activities of the parts with respect to the activities of the whole that are both identified and employed in explanations​[5]​.
The way that reductionists typically get around directly answering such questions is by focusing on specific parts of neurons that they take to be most relevant to the explanation of a higher-level phenomenon.  For example, Bickle is content to argue that a phenomenon like LTP can be explained by combinations of molecules or interactions taking place at the “molecular” level.  In this way, he forces both levels talk and part-whole talk on the processes that produce LTP.  Specifically, he states that LTP is a neurophysiological theory that explains learning by reference to the internal parts of cells, in particular, the molecules that comprise second messenger systems.  His argument, in brief form, goes something like this:  Currently we have a fairly detailed cognitive theory for associative learning in mammals, namely Rescorla and Wagner’s model of associative learning (Bickle 1998, 175).  This model interprets “a strengthening in an association of a conditioned and unconditioned stimulus as a strengthening in the components of the compound CS” (Bickle 1998, 175).  In turn, the model differentiates the individual components that comprise a conditioned response, namely, the conditioned stimulus, the unconditioned stimulus, the unconditioned response and the conditioned response quantitatively and “can be used to predict changing patterns of reinforcement” (Bickle 1998, 178).  By recognizing that the individual components may differ quantitatively, the model can be used to understand how contributions of individual neurons in a given circuitry that are involved in the production of a conditioned response may differ quantatively.  
To this end, Bickle cites Kandel and colleagues classical conditioning work on the gill-siphon withdrawal reflex in Aplysia, with respect to which, similar to the sensitization case we described above, they identified the contributions of individual neurons in the circuitry in the response, isolating specific intracellular second messenger cascades for each neuron in the circuit.  Noting that the intracellular mechanisms in Aplysia have been demonstrated to be to some extent conserved in the mammalian brain in the phenomenon of LTP, [which has been characterized as associative, in Hebbian terms, in so far as it involves simultaneous activation of the pre- and post-synaptic cells] Bickle uses the case to argue that a combinatorial reduction of cognitive associative theories about learning to neurophysiological theories of learning has already occurred.  He states:
The simplest forms of cellular plasticity, completely explainable in neurophysiological terms internal to neurons, produce in various sequences and combinations, higher-order associative phenomena [. . ].  We might similarly explain more complex cognitive phenomena (like the ability to track causal relations) with sequences and combinations of higher-order associative phenomena (Where we can fully characterize the anatomical and physiological components of these sequences and combinations in purely neurophysiological terms.  The result is similarly reductive.  (Bickle 1998, 182) 

	It is interesting that Bickle claims that cellular plasticity is “explainable in neurophysiological terms internal to neurons”, for, in both Kandel’s explanation of classical conditioning in Aplysia and hypotheses of LTP similar to the version we have offered above, the explanations are not in any interesting way internal to neurons.  Rather, they make reference to interactions between neurons, which involve intracellular activities, such as phosphorylation and ion influx as well as extracellular or between-neuron activities such as ion efflux, transmitter release and binding of transmitters to receptors.  
What Bickle wants to argue is that, as Kandel has suggested, “the intracellular mechanisms constituting the “letters” of [the] neurophysiological alphabet are presynaptic (Bickle 1998, 176)”, and it is mechanisms internal to the presynaptic neuron that are responsible for the enhancements in synaptic strength in the gill-siphon withdrawal reflex as a result of conditioning.  In turn, reference to these mechanisms suffices to explain both conditioning in Aplysia and LTP in mammals.   Now, why can’t this combinatorial reduction work?  Why can’t we construe associative learning as the result of changes in pre-synaptic neurons?
Clearly in both the Aplysia case and the LTP case, the intracellular changes that occur in both the pre- and postsynaptic neurons play a role in the production of the two phenomena, and these changes do not occur independently of each other—the neurons interact, engaging in activities that ultimately result in synaptic enhancement.  The events that take place in the postsynaptic neurons would not occur without contributions from presynaptic neurons.  Making reference to the intracellular mechanisms, namely the biochemical cascades in the presynaptic neuron alone, or in the case of LTP, in the post-synaptic neuron, does not provide an explanation for either phenomenon.  These intracellular mechanisms must be set in motion, it is the activities of kinases that results in LTP, but these kinases would not be activated without the contribution of transmitter from the presynaptic neuron.  
VI. Activities. Up to this point, we have stressed the importance of descriptions of activities in scientific explanations, particularly with respect to those we have analyzed, and noted that reductionist models typically neglect this role, yet we have not offered any detailed arguments for our claim that descriptions of activities are essential to any scientific explanation and must be treated as distinct from descriptions of entities or their properties.  This is our aim in this section.  
Neglect of activities.  Since the logical turn in philosophy, which followed the work of Frege (1879) Russell and Whitehead (1910-13), philosophical discussions have focused almost solely on entities and their properties (including relational properties).  This is true too of discussions about scientific explanation and reduction. This prejudice goes back to Hume’s entity based critique of causality. Variables are defined by the extension of the set of entities that they may take as arguments and their functions specify the ordering relations among those arguments.  Thinking in terms of logical structures brought to the philosophy of science peculiar ways of describing and setting up problems.  All problems relating to explanation and reduction were framed as requiring that relations be specified between substantive terms, where this meant nouns to nouns, and/or entities to entities and/or properties to properties.  The only verb countenanced in logic was the copula, to be.  So for example the problem of correspondence rules became how to relate terms (noun and modifying adjectives) of the theoretical language to the terms (nouns or modifying adjectives) of the observation language.  Again, reduction became another form of the problem of connectivity, how the noun terms in the reducing theory were related to the noun terms in the reduced theory.  The problems involved in using models and analogies in science were formulated as the problem of taking the properties of one entity and showing how they mapped onto the properties of an entity from a different domain. Virtually every problem in philosophy, and philosophy of science, was reconstructed in terms of entities and lists of their properties.  This was not surprising since the formalisms of logic, Boolean algebra, set theory and data and list structures require such a commitment.  Every description which is not a noun must be turned, by nominalizing into a noun-like variable (or constant,) into canonical form.   The logical formalism was driven not only by a desire for clarity and having structures required for formal inference, but also by an epistemic motive.  This way of analysis was taken to be part of the empiricism that followed Hume.  On this view, all one could perceive (or truly know) were objects and their properties, so anything else had to be constructed or inferred.
	Now there are a number of arguments as to why activities ought to be treated on a par with entities, and stronger ones as to why the are ineliminable parts of mechanisms. Many of these arguments are implicit in twentieth century cognitive and developmental psychology. In what follows, we shall attempt to develop a few of these arguments. Then we shall turn our attention to describing some of those aspects of activities that are relevant to scientific explanation.
1.  Epistemic priority.  Typically, activities are described by verbs; nouns describe entities.  One can as we noted above, nominalize all verbs by making them participles or gerunds.  But, epistemically, in order to nominalize a verb form and attribute it to an entity, one must be able to pick out the activity or the action referred to by the verb and have available its verb form description before one may correctly attribute it, in nominalized form, to an entity.  That is, epistemically the identification of the activity described by the verb is prior to that of any nominalized derivative.  So if we were to nominalize "breaks" ["to break"] into, say, "breaking", the participle form, we still have to be able to pick out cases of the activity of breaking, which is what is described by "breaks" in order to apply the participle to an object. To take another example, consider the Aplysia case: The facilitory neuron, upon stimulation, releases transmitter (sp. 5-HT) into the synaptic cleft.  We need to be able to identify the activity of neurotransmitter being released from the facilitory neuron in order to attribute the property of “5-HT-transmitter-releasing” to the neuron. 
People learn to pick out and categorize activities as well as they do entities, and independently.  This is how they learn what verbs mean.  (Tomasello and Merriman 1995, pp. 1-18)  Referents of verbs (activities or, often, human actions) are taken by young children as being categories in much the same way objects are.  People, including children, categorize the world into running, breaking, bonding, etc. just as they do into flowers, bears and bootstraps. The difference, of course, is that it is always some thing that is involved in an activity, whereas we presume that we may pick out things without also picking out activities.  However, activities, since they may be instantiated by many different individual things and often even kinds of things, must be identifiable independently of the individual entities that are acting.  The upshot of this view of verb learning is that learning verbs is independent of learning nouns, and each must be treated distinctly.  This is then epistemic independence.  
An argument for epistemic priority might be given by arguing that object permanence is only learned through grasping and object control.  So the very idea of a static, permanent object is dependent upon sensori-motor skills, which are in themselves activities.  So a child must first develop the requisite sensori-motor skills before acquiring any concept of object permanence. (Cf. Piaget, Child’s Conception of the World).  Further, in developing these sensori-motor skills the child is developing knowledge of what activities are. This aspect of activity learning is procedural learning, where what is learned is how to do something or how to properly or effectively act.  Most sensori-motor knowledge is of this form.  There is no nominalized (propositional) version of this type of knowledge.  In fact, very often this form of knowledge is not available to consciousness and cannot be given explicitly in any verbal form. (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1995?) 
Further, children learn what objects do before they learn what objects are.  That is, in the early stages of development, children develop sensory-motor skills by engaging in activities with objects and in so doing, they gain some knowledge of cause and effect relations.  They learn what objects do.  This is prior to their learning a language.  To borrow a classic example from Piaget, Peek-a Boo.
2.  Perception of activities is as fundamental (if not more so) than perception of objects or entities.  Perception of causality is a good example. Cf. J. J. Gibson 1966 1980 (following Michotte and like Gunar Johanssen ) has argued that people perceive events more fundamentally than objects.  In fact, Gibson has argued that perception of change is our most fundamental perceptual ability.  (Cf. Gibson 1966, and Machamer "Gibson and the Conditions of Perception" in Machamer and Turnbull, Studies in Perception, OSU Press, 1975).  Change is the result of changing interactions between perceiver and environment.  Further, perceivers most fundamental abilities are those determined by the ecologically salient categories that they learn to discriminate. (Gibson 1979)
3.  Epistemic saliance of causal structures.  Verbal structures, especially causal verbal structures are as important if not more important for learning and comprehension than are nominalizations. (Kintsch, 1986, 1992) His studies have shown that reading comprehension tasks involve readers who first attend to causal verbs in the passages they read, which they then use to construct their internal (situation) model of what happened, which subsequently is accessed to provide recall data.  Interestingly, it has been noted that how well (accurately) they recall a text depends upon the coherency of the situation model constructed, and this is measured by how well the causal connections are rendered in the text. Specifically, the syntax of the written sentence provides cues to the reader for what are the important causal relations in a text.  (p. 2)  Readers use active knowledge based schemata as the basis for constructing situation models about what they read.  Specific people, events or names usually play a secondary role and are filled in once the causal schema is recalled.
Similarly in learning, children learning history tend to recall what they have learned better when the text is written in terms of active causal verbs, then when the same events are described by relevantly similar adjectives and the verb "to be".  (Cf., Perfetti)
In both cases, active causal verbs are more effective and important for learning and recall than are nouns that might do the "same descriptive jobs".  Causal verbs set of schemata or frames, which are then used to access prior knowledge representations of similar situations.  Causal verb schemata are what we have been calling types of activities.  This suggests that people attend identify and categorize activities in a fundamental way.
4. The ambivalent nature of activities and levels once again.  Levels may be specified, and sometimes are, but relative to purpose of the description (interest of the describer) and to coherency of description (e.g. accepted assumptions of the field in which the description is being given.).  Levels are not ontically or epistemically identifiable or privileged.  Often times they cannot even be identified or separated.  So for example, try to answer the following questions.  Is LTP part of memory recall?  Part of retrieval behavior?  Is cell dehydration part of thirst?  Is amygdala activation part of fear?  Is "part of" in these claims, anything like mirological part whole relations?  How about "Calcium (Ca++) influx activates biochemical cascades", is this part of the mechanism of LTP?  Now here it seems we want to say, yes.  But is the Ca++ influx part of LTP? Is the question even well formed? Is the Ca++ part of the sensory neuron?  Are these both at the same level??  Is releasing glutamate at the same level as depolarizing cells? (cf. Wittgenstein Phil Inv, how many parts has a broom; and Quine rabbit parts)
 It is hard because it is irrelevant in most cases to assign levels to causal verbs.   Causal verbs, depending upon interest of the describer, may be assigned indifferently to many prima facie different levels.  A common example, would be "runs".  A whole person runs, feet run, groups run, etc.  There is no justifiable, non-tendentious philosophical justification for presuming one of these "levels" is prior to any other.
Similarly  in transitive causal verbs, the object of the verb can be described at many levels.  E.g., John hit (a) Harry (b) Harry's face (c) Harry's septum, (d) the Speaker of the House, etc.  the "level" described depends on the interest of the person giving the description, which is descriptions, of course subject to all kinds on social cultural constraints. 
There is no ontic or epistemic precedence apart for this descriptive purpose.  Now, in scientific cases the descriptive purpose is most often to describe the mechanism being investigated, and as we have shown this involves many activities and entities that prima facie are at different levels.
VII. How Neuroscientists Conceive of Their Task and How A Model of Mechanisms Best Captures the Nature of Explanation in the Biological and Neurosciences.  Both the explanation of sensitization in Aplysia and of LTP in the mammalian brain make reference to entities and the activities in which they engage that are productive of these phenomena.  Neurobiologists seeking to explain both kinds of phenomena view their task as a reductive one; specifically, they are interested in discovering the mechanisms involved in the production of such phenomena.  This requires that neuroscientists take what they themselves characterize as “reductive steps”, yet this does not mean reduction in the way it is traditionally conceived by philosophers.  While neuroscientists do buy into the levels framework for the sake of differentiating distinct areas of research, what they mean by reduction is trying to locate the entities and activities productive of a given phenomenon at increasingly more detailed levels, which might, with respect to the hypotheses we have considered, be construed as involving moving from an analysis of interactions between neurons to interactions between protein molecules internal to neurons.  This does not, however, mean that they aim to reduce neurons to molecules, rather, they want to know how the entities and activities taking place both internal and external to neurons result in the production of a given phenomenon. 
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^1	  Bechtel (1994) has another kind of argument for the interdependence of levels.  His is based on emergent systemic properties that constrain the functions of entities at a lower level.  But we would take this constraining of function to be constraints on structures of entities and on what activities the entities engage in.  
^2	 
^3	   In explanation of this phenomenon, when the tail is stimulated it enervates a facilitory neuron that synapses onto the axon of the sensory neuron that is attached to the siphon and synapses onto the motor neuron.  In turn, the two circuits are connected, and effecting the tail-facilitory-sensory neuron circuit, has a subsequent effect on the sensory-motor neuron circuit.
^4	  Various authors have suggested that reductions are often accompanied by corrections to the theory to be reduced.  How these corrections are represented differs from one model to the next.
^5	  This again is like Bechtel's (1994)  emergent systemic properties, but now applied to activities.
